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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly ten years after consultations were initially requested, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) met on 
January 28, 2013, to discuss the remedy to the U.S.—Gambling dispute. After a 
series of compliance proceedings, the DSB found that the United States had 
failed to implement its recommendations and rulings—namely, to provide 
online gambling service suppliers of Antigua and Barbuda treatment no less 
favorable than like U.S. suppliers. Despite adverse rulings, the United States 
chose not to comply; the DSB consequently authorized the suspension of 
concessions and obligations to the United States with respect to intellectual 
property rights. However, Antigua and Barbuda has yet to exercise its right to 
suspend its intellectual property obligations to the United States.1 What might 
cause these sorts of breakdowns in WTO compliance?  
In the study of international relations and international law, two dominant 
theories have emerged to explain international legal compliance: first, the 
enforcement approach, which argues that implementation failures occur due to 
the gross costs of compliance; second, the management school, which argues 
that states prefer compliance, but are hindered by domestic administrative 
constraints. These predominant theories have particular significance in the study 
of WTO compliance as they guide legal structure and policy decisions. To test 
these theories, this Article asks: Does the influence of interest groups or the 
domestic compliance structure explain the WTO’s ability to compel members to 
comply with adverse dispute settlement decisions? Alternatively, does the 
enforcement approach or the management school help predict potential WTO 
compliance?  
Binary logistic regressions and Cox proportional hazard (PH) models were 
used to analyze 120 adverse decisions in the DSB of the WTO. To test the two 
theoretical frameworks mentioned above, statistical models included variables 
related to the required use of legislation and, importantly, the types of 
legislatures known to be more influenced by interest groups. In support of the 
enforcement approach, the empirical evidence presented in this Article suggests 
that it is not simply the domestic compliance structure that drives non-
compliance; rather, it is the compliance structures that are more likely to 
 
 1 See William New, Antigua & Barbuda to Lift US IP Protection Protection in 2017 if US Fails to 
Comply with WTO Ruling, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/11/28/ 
antigua-barbuda-lift-us-ip-protection-2017-us-fails-comply-wto-ruling/; William New, US Misrepresentations 
Called Out by Antigua in Online Gambling Case at WTO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/09/29/us-misrepresentations-called-antigua-online-gambling-case/. 
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capitulate to domestic interest groups that better explain whether and when a 
country complies with an adverse decision by the panel or the Appellate Body 
(AB) of the WTO.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the two predominant 
theories of international legal compliance. Part II presents the dataset, how it 
was culled, and the variables to be tested. Supporting the enforcement approach, 
Part III models the association between the explanatory variables and response 
variables in-time/time-to compliance. The conclusion follows.  
I. INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE THEORY 
The collaboration between scholars of international relations and 
international law has built “an interdisciplinary research agenda.”2 This joint 
research program has flourished around dialogue concerning dispute resolution 
and international legal compliance.3 International relations and international law 
scholars have developed theoretical frameworks to explain the implications of 
international law. Prominent liberal theorist Robert Keohane, incorporating 
contemporary theoretical developments within international relations, described 
“two optics” of international law: an instrumentalist optic and a normative 
optic.4 The instrumentalist optic argues that international law “will matter only 
if [it] affect[s] the calculations of interest by agents,” while the normative optic 
argues that international law “constrain[s] subjective interpretations, promote[s] 
habitual compliance, and impose[s] reputational costs on violators of norms . . . 
.”5 Though Keohane concludes that the “instrumental and normative incentives 
work in tandem,” his theoretical dichotomy has continued to develop and 
mature.6 
Two dominant theories of compliance now emerge from Keohane’s initial 
optics: the enforcement approach and the management school. Taking its 
inspiration from the instrumentalist optic, the enforcement approach utilizes a 
rational actor model and argues that non-compliance occurs strategically when 
 
 2 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 369 (1998). 
 3 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 457–58, 487 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 223 (1993).  
 4 See Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 487, 488 (1997).  
 5 Id. at 489, 491.  
 6 Id. at 501. 
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the benefits outweigh the costs of defection.7 Enforcement approach scholars 
believe that efficient breach or strategic non-compliance occurs due to interest 
groups’ influence on national policy.8 Alternatively, drawing from the normative 
optic, the management school sees international organizations as seeking to 
“promote compliance not through coercion but . . . through [the] interactive 
process of justification, discourse, and persuasion,” where “the impetus for 
compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction, as it is fear of diminution 
of status through loss of reputation.”9 When non-compliance does occur, the 
management school claims it is the result of either the domestic compliance 
structure or capacity constraints and treaty ambiguity. It is best to understand the 
enforcement approach and management school as mid-level theories that drive 
hypotheses in academic scholarship—as well as policy—in the development of 
international compliance mechanisms.10  
 
 7 See LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
7–10 (1989); A. Walter Dorn & Andrew Fulton, Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, 
Sticks, and the Case of North Korea, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 17, 35 (1997); Jonas Tallberg, Paths to 
Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT’L ORG. 609, 611 (2002). 
 8 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE WORLD POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION 27–29 (1997); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal 
Remedies, Legalized Noncompliance, and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2011). 
 9 Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2636 (1997) 
(reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (Harv. Univ. Press 1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (Clarendon Press 1995)). 
 10 Yet, it is also important to note that this theoretical dichotomy is perhaps an oversimplification of the 
literature. First, not dissimilar from the combined optics of Keohane, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, 
some scholars call for a combined enforcement/management model within their study of European Union (EU) 
compliance. See, e.g., Tanja A. Börzel, Tobias Hofmann & Diana Panke, Caving In or Sitting Out? Longitudinal 
Patterns of Non-Compliance in the European Union, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 454, 467 (2012) (finding “strong 
empirical support for the effect of bureaucratic efficiency and a low number of domestic veto players on the 
ability to overcome violations of EU law”). Second, constructivist and legal process-based literature within 
international legal and WTO compliance scholarship, which stresses the pull of legalization and socialization, is 
largely ignored. See generally ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (OUP Oxford 2011); JOHN G. RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS 
ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (Routledge 1998); Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social 
Learning and European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553 (2001). This type of thick description better serves 
analysis when studying changes in legal structures such as the judicialization of dispute settlement from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the WTO. See generally Pavan Krishnamurthy, Effective 
Enforcement: A Legalistic Analysis of WTO Dispute Settlement, 5 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 191 (2012); J.H.H. 
Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy 
of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191 (2001); Bernhard Zangl, Judicialization Matters! A 
Comparison of Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 825 (2008). Moreover, 
operationalizing levels of socialization and resolving endogenous relationships between legalization and 
compliance has proven to be difficult. See Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of 
Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 661, 678 (2000) (“Although normative analysis identifies actors and processes, 
explanation too often appears to be post hoc. As norms become more deep-seated, the empirical difficulties do 
not end, since those norms are precisely the ones that are least likely to be explicitly invoked.”). Moreover, this 
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Predicting the growth in international legal compliance scholarship, liberal 
theorists Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter called for further empirical 
WTO DSB research to be nested within wider theoretical developments in the 
international compliance literature.11 Their calls have not been ignored. Earlier 
studies of the WTO sought to analyze the utility of the WTO DSB for developing 
and least-developed countries by studying the initiation of disputes. Partially in 
support of the management school, a consensus has emerged that the economic 
dynamics between countries mattered less than the domestic capacities of 
potential dispute initiators that drove decisions regarding the utilization of the 
DSB.12 
 
Article, which only looks at the WTO and not the transition from the GATT to the WTO, should not find 
variability in the level of legalization and, therefore, processed-based theories are less appropriate. Third, the 
realist charge of international law is largely omitted. From legal positivism, see, for example, JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2005); GEORGE F. 
KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 (Penguin Group USA 1951); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) (explaining (neo)realist international 
relations (IR) theory); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law”, THE NAT’L INTEREST, Winter 
1989/90 at 3; John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1994); 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260 (1940) 
(explaining scholars have repeatedly proclaimed international law to be epiphenomenal). However, by most 
accounts, international law, having entered the “post-ontological era,” is perceived as a legitimate constraint on 
states. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (Clarendon Press 1995); 
see also LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 42 (Columbia Univ. Press 1979) 
(claiming “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time”). With both international compliance theories drawing from the neoliberal institutional 
tradition of international relations, see generally, for example, ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW 
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (Princeton Univ. Press 1984); Robert O. 
Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39 (1995), the enforcement 
approach mediates some of the pessimism of neo-neo theory, see Ole Wæver, The Rise and Fall of the Inter-
Paradigm Debate, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND 149 (Steve Smith, et al. eds., 
Columbia Univ. Press 1996), and the management school appropriates the optimism of constructivist liberal 
theory, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 
(2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). 
 11 See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 542 (Walter Carlsnaes, et al. eds., SAGE 
Publications 2002).  
 12 See, e.g., Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 559, 566–68, 576–77 (2009); Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing 
Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. POL. 1033, 1033 (2009); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth 
A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade, 34 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 557, 591–92 (2005).  
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Likewise, there has been a growing interest in treaty compliance,13 and this 
interest has extended to the international economic treaties within the WTO.14 
However, most recently, several studies have attempted to analyze the WTO 
compliance question beyond the descriptive analytics of their predecessors. 
Importantly, these studies have followed the enforcement/management 
theoretical divide as explored below.  
A. The Enforcement Approach and the WTO 
Enforcement approach scholars claim that the DSB’s compliance success 
comes from “the enhanced ability of the . . . [WTO] to respond to and punish . . 
.” violators rather than its normative legitimacy because of the central role 
played by domestic special interests in shaping the liberalization of trade.15 
These assumptions are then used to justify game-theoretical and public choice 
models when describing WTO compliance.16 Subsequently, several WTO 
scholars have utilized inferential statistics in studies to confirm this framework.  
Political economists Tobias Hofmann and See Yeon Kim argue “the relative 
political importance of the domestic economic sectors at the center of WTO 
disputes is key to understanding why opportunistic governments provide 
extended periods of non-compliance, or protection, to some of these sectors.”17 
Deploying enforcement approach theory, their study used the “relative 
employment and GDP of the sector” affected by a WTO dispute as a proxy for 
 
 13 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75 
(1998); Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010).  
 14 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2 WASH. 
U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 97, 104 (2003); William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 125–26 (2009); Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance Through the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 383, 383, 385 (2006); Bruce 
Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397 (2007).  
 15 See George W. Downs et al., Is The Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 
50 INT’L ORG. 379, 391 (1996); see also Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, 
and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 603–04, 619, 631–32 (2000).  
 16 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of 
International Trade, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501, 514–16, 528–32 (1985); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The 
World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15445, 2009); 
Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363, 364–65, 373–74, 384–
85 (2005).  
 17 See Tobias Hofmann & See Yeon Kim, The Political Economy of Compliance in WTO Disputes 6 
(Apr. 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Conf3_Hofmann-
Kim-25.09.09.pdf. 
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the relative importance of the said sector.18 However, this approach has three 
methodological limitations. 
First, the size proxy for interest group power does not conceptualize the 
significance of a sector. The significance could, in fact, be understood through 
the “ability to organize and pressure government,” which might have “little to 
do with its size,”19 as was the case with the agriculture sector in the EC—
Hormones dispute.20 In fact, one could imagine situations where smaller interest 
groups could leverage more capital and resources than their larger counterparts 
by more easily overcoming collective action problems. Second, domestic 
industry employment would not capture procedural disputes. For example, the 
highly controversial manner in which antidumping measures are calculated, as 
found in the four separate U.S.—Continued Zeroing21 cases or the eleven unique 
complaints in the U.S.—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)22 dispute, would not be 
operationalized appropriately in the Hofmann and Kim study. Third, while it 
may be true that governments are locked in a two-level game between domestic 
constituents (i.e., interest groups) and international obligations,23 it should be 
noted that economic differences between governments could be an antecedent 
or at the very least a confounding variable as these relations set the rules for the 
international games.24 These and other difficulties of analyzing interest groups’ 
influence in a global value chain have led scholars to develop creative 
methodological strategies to operationalize interest groups’ influence.  
Following political economist Daniel Kono’s theory of trade obfuscation, in 
which forward-looking governments are expected to establish complex barriers 
 
 18 See id. at 14.  
 19 See Gabriele Spilker, Compliance with WTO Dispute Rulings 4 (NCCR Trade Reg., Working Paper 
No. 2011/25, 2012). 
 20 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1999).  
 21 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/AB/R (adopted Feb. 4, 2009). 
 22 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2003). 
 23 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 427, 427, 432 (1988); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian 
Politics (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15445, 2009). 
 24 That is, interest groups’ influence may be meaningless with regard to international regulations if the 
lobbied government’s influence on international organizations is marginal. It would be difficult to imagine firms 
that predominantly lobby developing/least-developed governments having greater influence on international 
organizations than firms that predominantly lobby developed governments. See Börzel, Hofmann & Panke, supra 
note 10; Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union International Organization, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 
150, 156 (1998). 
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to trade,25 Gabriele Spilker, an international political economist, finds that 
complex barriers enacted due to domestic industry influence significantly 
prolong WTO compliance time.26 Due to the aforementioned difficulties of 
operationalizing interest group influence, Spilker opts to include a dummy 
variable for agriculture, complex barriers, and finally an interaction term 
between the two to put the theory of trade obfuscation to practice. Nevertheless, 
this analysis remains problematic for the following two reasons.  
First, for Spilker, compliance occurs when the “complainant country 
officially acknowledges that the trade policies of the [respondent] country have 
been brought into congruence with WTO law.”27 Furthermore, it is argued that 
it is unlikely for countries to accept non-changes and give up due to the cost of 
the dispute. While this coding strategy is cogent, it does not account for the oft-
resorted Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Articles 21 and 22 
understandings, which extend the statute of limitations beyond lapsed panel 
authority.28 These legal avenues, which in recent years have become more 
common, are negotiated between members who disagree whether compliance 
has occurred, establishing a legal gray area. Recent U.S.-Sino disputes, 
particularly those relating to intellectual property rights and anti-
dumping/countervailing duties, highlight the use of these understandings due to 
ex post disagreements. This coding strategy would therefore have difficulty 
reconciling prolonged disputes, such as China—Intellectual Property Rights,29 
China—Publications and Audiovisual Products,30 and US—Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China).31  
Second, Spilker only utilizes duration models of dispute dyads instead of 
using both regression and duration models for aggregated dispute issues. Cox 
PH models right censor cases that have not yet occurred and are assumed to be 
uninformative predictors for censored values.32 In specifying the research 
 
 25 See Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency, 100 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 369, 376 (2006); Spilker, supra note 19, at 4–6. 
 26 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 4–6. 
 27 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 6, 9. 
 28 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 29 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2009). 
 30 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 
2010). 
 31 Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011).  
 32 See Taane G. Clark et al., Survival Analysis Part I: Basic Concepts and First Analyses, 89 BRIT. J. 
CANCER 232, 232, 238 (2003).  
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question to focus only on compliance times, Spilker, in effect, ignores some of 
the most controversial cases of indefinite non-compliance from the United 
States, such as U.S.—Section 211 Appropriations Act,33 U.S.—Hot-Rolled 
Steel,34 or U.S.—Gambling.35 The utilization of the dyads of cases as opposed 
to aggregates of dispute issues may also inflate the significance of certain cases 
that were formally initiated by many countries or had subsequent proceedings 
regarding compliance. Based on the dataset constructed for this Article, the 
decision to use dyads created 181 unique cases, while aggregation of disputes to 
their core issue created 120 cases. This is a substantial variation that has the 
potential to inflate the significance of case characteristics that were found in 
many congruent dyads.  
In another novel methodological choice to operationalize interest groups’ 
influence, the trade scholar Stephanie Rickard argues that violations of 
GATT/WTO agreements are more common among governments elected 
through majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member districts.36 These 
electoral systems have been said to incentivize narrow targeted transfers to 
special interests as they are centered on candidates, while proportional electoral 
rules and/or multi-member districts are more likely to be scrutinized by the 
broader constituency as they are centered on parties.37 Proportional 
representation (PR) in elected legislatures is said to encourage more examination 
from average constituent members, as members do not have to vote 
sophisticatedly38 and parties must appeal to large segments of the population.39 
It has been widely documented that the general constituency in PR legislatures 
can better punish officials who capitulate to special interests, while majoritarian 
 
 33 Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted Jan. 2, 2002); WT/DS176/1/Add.156 (Jan. 15, 2016) (latest status report). 
 34 Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products 
from Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R (adopted Aug. 23, 2001); WT/DS285/26 (April 25, 2013) (latest 
communication from Antigua and Barbuda). 
 35 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005). To date, these three aforementioned 
cases have remained non-compliant after a pre-established implementation deadline by 108, 107, and ninety-
eight months, respectively. 
 36 See Stephanie Rickard, Democratic Differences: Electoral Institutions and Compliance with 
GATT/WTO Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 711, 714–17 (2010).  
 37 See TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS (MIT Press 
2005); Jon M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of 
Electoral Formulas, 14 ELECTORAL STUD. 417, 432–34 (1995). 
 38 Sophisticated or tactical voting refers to the practice of pragmatically supporting candidates that are 
not a voter’s first choice so as to prevent an even worse outcome. See ROBIN FARQUHARSON, THEORY OF VOTING 
(Yale Univ. Press 1969).  
 39 See Eric Reinhardt, Posturing Parliaments: Ratification, Uncertainty, and International Bargaining 
(1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with Columbia University). 
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electoral rules and/or single-member districts create a protectionist bias due to 
election strategies that privilege decisions to garner a simple majority.40  
Rickard focuses on a broader dataset of later GATT and early WTO cases 
(from 1980 to 2003) and treats any case filed against a country as a violation, 
despite the fact that approximately only twenty-five percent of cases are litigated 
and, of those, ten percent are found to have no violation.41 Therefore, the vast 
majority of the Rickard dataset does not evaluate technical compliance of WTO 
rulings. As nearly seventy-five percent of cases are concluded through mutually 
agreed solutions, the Rickard study is not about compliance but is rather a study 
of “bargains in the shadow of the law.”42 Additionally, analysis of the EU, which 
litigates in unison, has been removed from the dataset, unless a specific country 
was found to be a violator,43 thus ignoring one of the “primary users” of the 
WTO DSB.44 Crucially, there is no strong theoretical justification for the across-
the-board coding of majoritarian rules and/or single-member districts 
considering that the required use of legislation is the exception, not the rule. That 
is to say that the vast majority of compliance occurs through 
administrative/executive action. In studying dispute initiation as non-
compliance, the Rickard study does not account for administrative/executive 
compliance. When all countries are coded simply by their electoral systems, it 
is incorrectly assumed that these systems are implicated in the noncompliance 
of WTO regulation, when in fact it is most often administrative/executive 
inaction and not legislative inaction that drives noncompliance. Finally, the 
question of timely compliance is also not analyzed, as duration models are not 
utilized.  
As can be seen, a common thread among these studies is the 
operationalization of interest groups’ influence so as to analyze the driving 
mechanism of the enforcement approach.  
 
 40 See Carolyn L. Evans, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation, 21 
ECON. & POL. 278, 300–05 (2009); Grossman & Helpman, supra note 23. 
 41 See Rickard, supra note 36, at 713. 
 42 See Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in 
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 163 (2000). 
 43 See Rickard, supra note 36, app. A. 
 44 See Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2010—A Statistical Analysis, 14 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 191, 194 (2011). 
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B. The Management School and the WTO 
Management school scholars argue that domestic compliance structure can 
hinder effective compliance.45 Moreover, legal capacity constraints have been 
shown to be quite significant in relation to dispute initiation in the case of the 
WTO.46 These scholars argue that if members have the regulatory ease and 
capacity, panel or AB rulings should act as treaty clarifications and should 
encourage timely compliance.47 
Legal empiricists Adam Chilton and Rachel Brewster, in the only recent 
WTO compliance study pointing to the management school, argue that “the 
structure of the national government can have large and systematic effects on 
the country’s rate of compliance.”48 They claim “who[ever] within the 
government supplies compliance is the best predictor of whether and when the 
[U.S.] government complies with WTO rulings,” and that “[t]he need for 
congressional involvement in the compliance process both decreases the 
likelihood of compliance and delays compliance more than any other factor.”49 
However, there are methodological limitations.  
First, their study is only of the United States, so generalizability is 
inappropriate without further analysis. Second, coding decisions regarding 
compliance defer to claims by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
and not the WTO or complainants, which may inflate in-time compliance and 
deflate time-to compliance.50 Other member states may have different 
interpretations of U.S. compliance. One example of this potentially problematic 
methodological strategy is exemplified in the U.S.—Upland Cotton dispute.51 
The United States had claimed that it had become compliant with the DSB 
ruling; however, the United States was challenged again in the DSB by Brazil 
regarding the legitimacy of their implementation via DSU Article 21.5 
compliance proceedings and subsequently under DSU Article 22 regarding the 
authorization of remedies.52 In U.S.—Upland Cotton, the United States and 
 
 45 See Adam S. Chilton & Rachel Brewster, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the US Complies with 
WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 239 (2014). 
 46 See, e.g., Busch et al., supra note 12; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 12. 
 47 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 5. 
 48 See Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, at 203. 
 49 Id. at 6. 
 50 Id. at 25. 
 51 Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/R 
(adopted Mar. 3, 2005). 
 52 Specifically, cross-sector countermeasures were authorized in the form of suspension of certain 
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). See Recourse to Arbitration by the United States 
KRISHNAMURTHY GALLEYPROOFS 3/8/2018 2:08 PM 
388 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
Brazil established a framework for dispute settlement, which the United States, 
Brazil, and the adopted report of the WTO noted did “not constitute a mutually 
agreed solution to the dispute” but set “out parameters for discussions on a 
solution with respect to domestic support programs for upland cotton in the 
United States.”53 Despite this clarification, Chilton and Brewster code the 
compliance date as August 25, 2010, which happened to be the implementation 
of simply the joint framework. This coding decision was taken as the USTR 
considered this case to have been resolved.54  
For management school scholars studying the WTO, there is a concern about 
supply side dynamics, where the assumption is that governments would prefer 
to comply if possible. The enforcement approach and management school 
provide separate accounts regarding WTO compliance. However, in the words 
of Keohane, these theories both rely on incentive structures, where the 
enforcement approach draws from “instrumental” and the management school 
draws from “normative” optic.55  
II. DATA 
A. Dataset 
To test the effectiveness of the enforcement approach and the management 
school for predicting WTO compliance, data was drawn from the WTO Current 
Status of Disputes (CSD) database, which is representative of the WTO 
interpretation of a dispute. It is important to reiterate that a key component of 
this Article’s research question is concerned with testing the idea of compliance 
through compellence or the ability to secure or bring about change by the use of 
external threat or force. As the WTO “. . . has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, 
no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas,” it must rely on voluntary 
 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement - Decision by the Arbitrator, 
WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009). 
 53 See Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization, 
Braz.-U.S., June 25, 2010, WT/DS267/45. 
 54 See Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, app. C. Interestingly, on October 16, 2014, Brazil and the 
United States notified the WTO that, pursuant to Article 3.6 of the DSU, they agreed that this dispute was 
terminated. However, this mutually agreed upon solution occurred after Chilton and Brewster coded their 
dataset. Chilton and Brewster’s coding decision, rather, is a product of the United States’ position that the dispute 
was resolved. Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade 
Organization, supra note 53. 
 55 See Keohane, supra note 4, at 488. 
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compliance,56 although it does have an enforcement mechanism. It can authorize 
retaliation from other members, which would otherwise be considered in 
violation of the covered agreements. Considering that the WTO has an ability to 
compel, the methodology of this Article begins with the question: What would 
be the best manner to cull the available universe of cases to test compliance 
through compellence? The question gets complicated considering that many 
times disputes are withdrawn in light of a mutually agreed solution, the WTO 
affords a reasonable period of time (RPT) to comply with adverse decisions, and 
there may be situations where multiple cases occur for a single dispute.  
First, concerning mutually agreed solutions, cases that are withdrawn before 
rulings were not considered a test of compliance. Including these cases would 
answer a different research question—one that would focus on dispute 
resolution writ large and not compliance with WTO rulings. With this in mind, 
the dataset was constructed with a focus on adverse decisions adopted by the 
panel or the AB. Consequently, an adverse decision is when a complainant 
(plaintiff) “wins” and a respondent (defendant) is asked to reform any part of its 
trade policy.57  
Second, the data must be cut off to have appropriate analysis of duration and 
compliance, and this cutoff follows the WTO’s RPT framework of 
implementation. As noted by Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, implementation should 
not generally exceed fifteen months from the date of adoption of the report(s). 
There are three ways to establish RPT: member consensus (which has never been 
used), mutually agreed solution, or a determination by the arbitrator.58 This 
means that recommended implementation timeframes are built into the 
compliance process. For the purposes of this dataset, a country that has not 
implemented the recommendations after the RPT expired is only then in non-
compliance.  
 
 56 See Judith H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 
416, 417 (1996).  
 57 However, two cases were included where a mutually agreed solution had been established before a 
panel decision was made. These were the only two cases where panel reports were still released with adverse 
recommendations to the respondent after a mutually agreed solution had been reached. See Panel Report, 
Korea—Measures Affecting the Importation of Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS391/R (circulated July 3, 2012); Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Butter Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS72/R (circulated Nov. 24, 1999). The Korea—Bovine Meat (Canada) and EC—Butter reports 
were still released because the mutually agreed solution was presented after the panel report had been written, 
but one month before it had been released.  
 58 See DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
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Third, this dataset had to account for the fact that the WTO has a legal 
process for resolving disputes over implementation as well as accounting for 
multiple cases stemming from the same core dispute. Pursuant to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU, if a member believes that implementation has not occurred, despite 
notification by the respondent otherwise, the member has the right to initiate 
dispute settlement proceedings regarding implementation. A case may be of 
three statuses regarding compliance proceedings: ongoing, non-compliance, or 
compliance. As it is difficult to make an educated prediction of what the WTO 
will find, ongoing implementation proceedings were removed from the dataset.59 
A finding of non-compliance or compliance was then consolidated with the core 
dispute. An additional reason to consolidate cases was situations where multiple 
cases were filed against the same country regarding the same policy. Some 
studies have monadically aggregated cases,60 while other studies have kept them 
dyadically separate.61 These methodological choices often reflect the research 
question at hand; whereas monadic aggregation is argued to be appropriate for 
studies of compliance, dyadic analysis is claimed to be more appropriate for 
research questions concerning the impetus to initiate disputes.62 In this case, it 
was appropriate to consolidate the cases because the research focuses on 
respondent compliance and not dispute resolution broadly. 
The benefit of the above methodological decisions is twofold. First, 
considering that the focus of this Article is the ability of the WTO to compel 
members, it follows that analysis should be directed to situations where the DSB 
delivers decisions that would necessitate changes in trade policy. Any other 
dataset would include situations where another member simply began the 
dispute settlement. Second, there has been an adverse decision in approximately 
 
 59 There have been two cases where compliance was found in the implementation proceedings and five 
cases that were found to be non-compliant after implementation proceedings. There are five current 
implementation proceedings. 
 60 See, e.g., Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45; Hofmann & Kim, supra note 17. 
 61 See, e.g., HENRIK HORN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & HÅKAN NORDSTRÖM, IS THE USE OF THE WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM BIASED? 9, 19 (1999); Michael M. Bechtel & Thomas Sattler, What Is Litigation 
in the World Trade Organization Worth?, 69 INT’L ORG. 375, 386–87 (2015); Busch et al., supra note 12, at 
559–60; Davis & Bermeo, supra note 12, at 1034, 1040–41, 1045; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 12, at 558, 
561; Thomas Sattler, Gabriele Spilker & Thomas Bernauer, Does WTO Dispute Settlement Enforce or Inform?, 
44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 877, 892 (2014). 
 62 Control variables needed to be consolidated when aggregating cases. Following Chilton and Brewster, 
macroeconomic indicators were totaled, as they were scalar. Moreover, for Chilton and Brewster, averaging was 
found to not change results in a statistically significant manner. See Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, at 43. 
Most importantly, totaling macroeconomic indicators is considered to be more appropriate because it better 
reflects the potential compliance pull of coalitions in the WTO DSB. For all other variables, the highest count 
was used, as they were ordinal variables.  
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ninety percent of the adopted reports, which means that the dataset will remain 
largely representative.63  
In summary, there were three causes for case removal from the dataset: 1) 
the dispute was in the stages before a ruling; 2) the complainant withdrew, 
settled, or terminated a dispute before a decision had been adopted; or 3) the 
respondent was found to be in compliance. The last case in this dataset is the 
Canada—Feed-In Tariff dispute, which was implemented in June 2014.64  
These coding decisions resulted in a total of 120 adverse decisions where 
RPT had expired out of the total universe of 482 WTO DSB cases. 
 
Table 1: Dataset Breakdown 
 
Implementation (of 120) 
Implemented 101 
Not implemented 19 
  
In-time Compliance (of 120) 
In-time 73 
Not in-time 47 
It is also interesting to note the divisions in the governments that initiate disputes 
versus those governments that had disputes initiated against them. DSB usage 
distributions of governments, which have been either respondents or 
complainants, are presented in Appendix 1. Unsurprisingly, the United States 
and the EU remain the largest players in the DSB as both complainants and 
respondents. As will be highlighted in the various variables presented, the 
distribution of the respondents and complainants drive many of the controls. 
 
 63 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 398. However, only a quarter of disputes have adopted reports.  
 64 See Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013). The government of Canada was able to reform its policies and 
Ontario’s laws regarding local content requirements (LCRs) in a timely manner. Moreover, the implementation 
of this case is unlikely to be disputed and, thus, appropriate to include in the dataset as the subsequent July 2014 
DSB meeting had no formal follow-up complaints regarding compliance. In this case, “the policy goal [may 
have been] to protect and shelter these subsidies,” because governments “may be ready to agree that, if the most 
blatant protectionist devices (such as LCRs) are avoided and the distortions are kept to the minimum, certain 
green energy subsidies can be accepted.” See Luca Rubini, What Does the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable 
Energy Subsidies Tell Us About Methodology in Legal Analysis? The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 23–24 
(RSCAS, Working Paper No. 2014/05, 2014).  
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However, in recent years, the usage of the DSB has been somewhat more evenly 
distributed in terms of developing and least-developed countries.65  
B. Response Variables 
The decision to disaggregate the response variable of compliance was based 
on eminent WTO scholar William Davey’s concern of foot-dragging.66 He 
argues that within the non-compliance cases, there was a large time variation, 
necessitating two response variables in the study of the implementation of 
adopted reports: 1) in-time compliance, which asks if compliance occurred 
within the RPT; and 2) time-to compliance, which asks how long compliance 
took after the expiration of the RPT.  
Regarding in-time compliance, some more recent studies code compliance 
outcomes based on the understanding of the respondent,67 while others have used 
the complainant’s approval of compliance.68 As will be recalled, both strategies 
have their methodological limitations. Compliance is at times ambiguous.69 In 
light of the common Article 21 and 22 DSU processes which reserve standing 
in disputes, this Article codes compliance as when a complainant makes no 
further formal claim of non-compliance within the “statute of limitations”70 as 
well as situations where a respondent’s trade mission admits to non-
compliance.71  
 
 65 See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System at 18: Effective at Controlling the Major 
Players? 4 (RSCAS, Working Paper No. 2013/29, 2013).  
 66 See Davey, supra note 14, at 120. 
 67 See, e.g., Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45. 
 68 See, e.g., Spilker, supra note 19, at 9. 
 69 See generally Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶¶ 7.1–7.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Apr. 20, 
2005) (explaining that the United States made informal complaints, but no Article 21 and 22 Understandings 
were established, and no formal claims of noncompliance were levied).  
 70 “Statute of limitations” is not a phrase used by the WTO, but it serves as a useful legal parallel. A 
panel’s authority can lapse if a complainant who believes a respondent is still non-compliant after notified 
implementation does not take formal action. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, Japan—Countervailing Duties 
on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea—Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on 
Rules, ¶¶ 54–55, WTO Doc. WT/DS336/16 (adopted May 5, 2008) (lapsing panel authority pursuant to Article 
12.12 of the DSU due to party inaction). Often, though, an Understanding under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU 
is created to maintain standing (i.e., extend the statute of limitations indefinitely). Therefore, even if this type of 
Understanding was established, it would only be considered non-compliance if confirmed by the respondent 
after an Understanding had been established. Id. ¶ 6. 
 71  See Appellate Body Report, US—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 149, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted Jan. 2, 2002). The U.S. Mission to the WTO openly admitted its intention to work 
towards compliance. Id. Simultaneously, they claimed that they had complied with the adopted reports to the 
fullest extent possible at the time, as the ruling required legislative action and the U.S. Congress was not in 
KRISHNAMURTHY GALLEYPROOFS 3/8/2018 2:08 PM 
2018] TO ENFORCE OR MANAGE 393 
When calculating the time-to compliance, the data was coded to reflect a 
one-month delay after the expiration of the RPT. Because the DSB has, at most, 
one meeting per month and compliance dates reflect the day of notification to 
the WTO, implementation could have occurred up to one month before 
notification. The RPT has been recommended not to extend beyond fifteen 
months,72 though this is not appropriate to utilize as a baseline theory for a 
survival model as the RPT. The RPT can be significantly altered by mutually 
agreed solutions, so the fifteen-month guideline was utilized only for cases that 
were resolved before RPT was decided or no RPT could be found.73 Time-to 
compliance was considered zero if the case had resolved by the RPT. Within this 
novel dataset, approximately 60.8% of cases were implemented in-time, and, 
when timely compliance was not reached, it took on average approximately 25.4 
months after the expiration of the RPT for compliance. 
C. Explanatory Variables 
Following the literature, seven explanatory variables were introduced: 1) 
domestic compliance structure (the requirement of legislation); 2) interest 
groups’ influence (legislation required with majoritarian rule and/or single-
member districts); 3) economic differences (the log GDP per capita difference); 
4) U.S.-EU disputes; 5) non-tariff barriers (NTBs); 6) agricultural disputes; and 
7) agricultural NTBs.74 These variables were run through standard tests to 
account for the possibility of multicollinearity.75 
 
session. Id. Interestingly, this dispute became one of the thirty cases in the dataset where no compliance has 
occurred to date. 
 72 See DSU, supra note 58, art. 21.3(c). 
 73 See id., art. 21.3. 
 74 See supra Part I. 
 75 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 11. Despite Spilker’s statistically significant findings, the variable of the 
number of agreement violations was deemed to be extraneous due to its high degree of multicollinearity with 
the domestic compliance structure variable (two-tailed significance at the 0.01 level). Moreover, there was not 
a strong theoretical reason to justify the inclusion of this variable. It could be argued that the greater number of 
violations exert greater pressure on a respondent to comply with, as well as create, a more extensive 
implementation process, though there is little theoretical basis or empirical research to support this claim. Id. at 
5. Moreover, it is highly improbable that this variable is an antecedent to the legislation-required variable. It is 
difficult to imagine how the number of violations could determine domestic compliance structures of a country. 
It is far more likely that the degree of non-compliance could be driven by legislative initiatives that may not take 
into account international agreements, whereas a more specialized administrative/executive department would 
be more aware. Additionally, there is a degree of arbitrariness in the inclusion of agreement violations while 
ignoring violations of subsections of an agreement. Finally, there is a high degree of same-issue violations 
stemming from accession protocols and other agreements, thus distorting this variable. For an example, the series 
of China—Raw Materials cases for violations stemming from China’s Accession Protocol and the GATT 1994 
show a high degree of same-issue violations. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the 
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1. Domestic Compliance Structure 
When studying the U.S. WTO compliance record, Chilton and Brewster 
found that implementation that required legislative change was the best predictor 
of non-compliance.76 Following this finding, this Article coded how compliance 
was structured (administratively or legislatively) by reference to the various 
trade reports produced by each country.77  
This legislation-required variable represents the underlying management 
school theory being tested as it proxies capacity concerns. It is said that the 
tedious process of legislative initiatives inherently drives non-compliance and 
not special interests.78 Moreover, the interest groups’ influence variable should 
control for special interest influence within various legislatures as it draws on 
strong empirical evidence that majoritarian rule and/or single-member district 
legislatures are far more susceptible to interest group influence. Of disputes 
where the EU was the respondent, only compliance that required EU 
parliamentary action—as opposed to the European Council or European 
Commission—was coded as 1, because only the Parliament is directly elected. 
Finally, disputes that could be resolved from administrative/executive avenues 
are coded as 0. This choice overlays with empirical evidence that suggests that 
administrative bodies are far more susceptible to regulatory capture when 
compared to PR systems.79 Approximately twenty-eight percent of cases 
required legislation when complying with WTO adopted reports or when 
pursuing mutually agreed solutions.  
 
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, ¶ 226, WTO Doc. WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012). For these 
above reasons, the variable of the number of agreement violations cited was not included in the models.  
 76 See Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, at 203 (“The need for [U.S.] congressional involvement in the 
compliance process both decreases the likelihood of compliance and delays compliance more than any other 
factor.”). 
 77 It is important to note that disputes were not coded as legislation required unless legislation was actively 
needed for compliance. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
Made Fibre Underwear, ¶¶ 5–7, WTO Doc. WT/DS24/AB/R (adopted Feb. 25, 1997) (coding was not requiring 
legislation even though legislation created the violation). This was because legislation expired, therefore 
passively the legislature was needed (by not extending the import restriction), but there is no theoretical reason 
to code these types of cases otherwise (i.e., this theory claims that the tedious process of formal legislating is 
what drives non-compliance, not simply the jurisdiction of legislative trade policy).  
 78 See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origin of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 
(2004) (noting that interest groups “can transfer agenda-setting power from the Congress to the President”).  
 79 See, e.g., E. Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 203, 204–05 (2006); 
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture, 106 OXFORD Q. J. ECON. 1089, 1090–1092 (1991); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, 
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward A Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 
170 (1990) (“Postrevisionist theories demonstrate that modern democratic government allows many political 
actors to be free from oversight by the electorate or by those who do answer to the electorate.”).  
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2. Interest Groups’ Influence 
Hofmann and Kim proxy the influence of interest groups by analyzing the 
“relative employment and GDP of the sector at the center of and affected by a 
particular dispute.”80 Chilton and Brewster also point to the significance of U.S. 
lobbying groups when determining trade policy due to Section 301 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 1974, which allows industry groups or firms to petition the office 
of the USTR to initiate trade investigations and authorize unilateral sanctions 
when deemed appropriate.81 As summarized in the literature review, 
majoritarian rules and/or single-member districts require minimum winning 
coalitions versus consensus-based strategies of PR.82 Majoritarian rules and/or 
single-member districts have been found to hinder WTO compliance and 
broadly encourage protectionism because individual electoral incentives are 
argued to lead to collection action failures in terms of international agreements.83  
Following this theory, the disputes are coded as majoritarian rules and/or 
single-member districts based on the Center for Voting and Democracy’s 
international legislative elections dataset. As Chinese legislatures are not 
directly elected, they were coded as 0. The EU was coded as 0 as each member 
country is free to decide its own voting procedure, and proportional 
representation is commonly utilized for the election of the European Parliament. 
Finally, in countries where mixed member parallel electoral systems are utilized, 
the respondent electoral characteristic was coded as 0. To guarantee the 
appropriateness of this variable, it was only coded as 1 if the legislation-required 
variable was also coded as 1 for a particular dispute. This strategy is employed 
because there is no theoretical justification to account for majoritarian rules 
and/or single-member districts if a respective legislature is not required to take 
action for WTO compliance purposes. In conjunction with the aforementioned 
analysis of the domestic compliance structure variable, this variable should be 
seen as a proxy for the influence of interest groups. Approximately 14.2% of 
cases were coded as 1 for the interest groups’ influence variable.  
3. Economic Differences 
The log GDP per capita difference between complainant(s) and respondent 
was used to capture macroeconomic differences, which may drive non-
 
 80 See Hofmann & Kim, supra note 17, at 13. 
 81 However, Chilton and Brewster found no significant evidence of lobbying and its influence in 
compliance with adverse decisions. See Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, at 231. 
 82 See supra Part I. 
 83 See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text; Grossman & Helpman, supra note 23, at 21.  
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compliance and is an appropriate control variable for a variety of reasons: legal 
capacity,84 power dynamics,85 or simply to account for the greater historical use 
of the DSB by developed countries.86 After establishing a baseline year, which 
corresponded with the year of the final ruling, the World Bank Development 
Indicators dataset was utilized.87 The data currently uses international dollars 
based on the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) round. However, 
because Argentina did not participate in the ICP 2011, a 0.6 multiple based on 
neighboring estimates was used to roughly convert the Argentinian data.88 
Moreover, Taiwan (or Chinese Taipei, as referenced by the WTO) is not 
included in that dataset.89 For that reason, the CIA World Fact Book was used 
to supplement the data.90 The logarithm of the variable is taken so as to better 
interpret large order of magnitude differences between developed countries and 
developing/least-developed countries. The log GDP per capita difference 
between complainant(s) and respondent was utilized to then capture the 
economic difference between the members of the dispute.  
4. U.S.-EU Disputes 
A case was coded as being a U.S.-EU dispute if the United States was at 
least one of the complainants and the EU was the respondent or vice versa. U.S.-
EU disputes were controlled for because some of these disputes have been long 
standing in the GATT/WTO system and could potentially distort the findings as 
these two members account for about half of the litigation at the WTO.91 
Moreover, in their study of WTO compliance, Hofmann and Kim have found 
 
 84 See Guzman & Simmons, supra note 12, at 559 (“We find strong evidence that developing countries 
are constrained by their capacity to launch litigation . . . .”). But see Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt & Gregory 
Shaffer, Does Legal Capacity Matter: A Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 559, 560 (2009). (“In 
comparing our index to existing measures, we find that they are only weakly correlated, casting doubt on the 
literature’s understanding of the importance of legal capacity.”).  
 85 See HORN, MAVROIDIS & NORDSTRÖM, supra note 61. But see Guzman & Simmons, supra note 12, at 
559 (“We find . . . no evidence consistent with the power hypothesis.”). 
 86 See Rickard, supra note 36, at 719. 
 87 See World Bank Open Data, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 88 As a logarithm was taken, the statistical discrepancy for this estimation is expected to be minimal. 
 89 World Trade Organization, Member Information: Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_ 
taipei_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 90 See The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 91 See Library of the European Parliament, Principal EU-US Trade Disputes (2013) (“[A] number of 
long-running disputes between the EU and the US are indicative of the challenges negotiators of a bilateral trade 
agreement face.”). 
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U.S.-EU disputes as statistically significant.92 Seventeen, or approximately 
14.2%, of disputes in this dataset are U.S.-EU.  
5. Non-Tariff Barriers 
Following the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, NTBs 
are controlled for in this study.93 As noted by Kono, NTBs are considered more 
complex and, therefore, more difficult to remove once implemented.94 
Moreover, supply-side factors such as “electoral institutions and government 
partisanship” have been found to drive the use of NTBs.95 This variable was 
correlated with the GDP differential variable (two-tailed significance at the 0.05 
level). However, it was not removed from the general model due to the strong 
theoretical justification of the interaction term developed by Spilker for 
agricultural NTBs.96  
6. Agriculture 
This Article also includes a variable concerning the agricultural industry. 
Agricultural disputes are said to be especially tedious because the sector “has a 
strong ability to organize politically, form alliances with other stakeholders, 
publicize the dispute, and lobby for trade-restricting policies.”97 Even a small 
industry can wield great influence due to its ability to mobilize a broad base of 
constituents, as was the case with the European coalitions against genetically 
modified agriculture and hormone-laden meats from the Americas in the 
controversial EC—Biotech and EC —Hormones disputes.98 These disputes 
concerned EU precautions relating to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
 
 92 See Hofmann & Kim, supra note 17, at 22. 
 93 Spilker labels this variable as a complex trade-protective instrument that includes “technical barriers 
to trade, anti-dumping, subsidies or various other instruments, in contrast to tariffs and quotas,” which are 
assumed to be the least complex. Spilker, supra note 19, at 10. For this variable, this Article elects to follow 
many of the same coding decisions present in the Spilker dataset, making this non-tariff barrier (NTB) 
comparable to Spilker’s complex trade variable.  
 94 See Kono, supra note 25, at 371. 
 95 See Jong Hee Park, What Determines the Specificity of Subsidies?, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 413, 413 (2012), 
https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/56/2/413/1800933.  
 96 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 11. No significant statistical changes were present in the models when 
compared to the original models with the removal of the NTB variable. It is feasible, though, that countries with 
greater GDPs may have political economic structures that better allow for the creation of NTBs. However, as 
will be recalled, the GDP variable is the difference between the complainant(s) and respondent, so this potential 
causal issue is minimized.  
 97 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 10. 
 98 See generally Thomas Bernauer & Erika Meins, Technological Revolution Meets Policy and The 
Market: Explaining Crossnational Differences in Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation, 42 EUR. J. POL. RES. 
643, 653–54, 660 (2003); Spilker, supra note 19, at 4. 
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that were alleged to violate the WTO SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement.99 
These types of disputes were coded as agricultural if there was a specific 
violation of the Agreement on Agriculture or if a case regarded agricultural 
products. One-third of cases in the dataset were considered to be an 
agriculturally driven dispute.  
7. Agricultural Non-Tariff Barriers 
Kono shows that democracies prefer strategic and technical trade barriers to 
protect pivotal sectors.100 This could point to situations where interest groups—
in particular a heterogeneous agricultural lobby—influenced policy and 
legislation well before WTO violations were notified.101 Spilker has found the 
complex agricultural barrier variable to be statistically significant.102 To account 
for agricultural NTBs, an interactive term between the NTB and agriculture 
variable is included, comprising of the product of two dummy variables: 
agriculture and NTBs. Agricultural NTBs represented approximately twenty-
two percent of the cases. A summary of the variables is presented in Appendix 
2.  
III. RESULTS 
Two regression models are introduced in this section. The first, as presented 
in Section A, tests the in-time compliance variable using binary logistic 
regressions. The variables—economic differences, U.S.-EU, and interest groups’ 
influence—are statistically significant within this model. The second, as 
presented in Section B, tests the time-to compliance variable using a Cox PH 
model. The interest groups’ influence variable is the only significant variable 
within this model. Section C tests the robustness of the models.  
A. In-time Compliance 
As presented in Table 2, binary logistic regressions were used to test the in-




 99 See generally Bernauer & Meins, supra note 98. 
 100 See Kono, supra note 25, at 369, 371, 373; Spilker, supra note 19, at 8. 
 101 See Guzman & Simmons, supra note 12, at 581. 
 102 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 12. 
 103 The use of probit models did not significantly change the findings.  
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Table 2: In-time Compliance Binary Logistic Regression 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Interest Groups’ Influence -1.23** (0.55) 
  -2.12* 
(1.24) 





Economic Differences   0.96** (0.40) 
0.89** 
(0.40) 
US-EU   -1.46** (0.60) 
-1.39** 
(0.62) 
Non-tariff Barriers   -0.62 (0.56) 
-0.71 
(0.57) 
Agriculture   0.52 (0.85) 
0.22 
(0.87) 
Agricultural NTBs   -0.49 (0.98) 
-0.19 
(1.00) 






















(-2) Log Likelihood 155.39 159.66 143.50 139.90 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Four models are presented to dispel concerns of multicollinearity as the interest 
groups’ influence variable (legislation required with majoritarian rule and/or 
single-member districts) is correlated with the domestic compliance structure 
variable (legislation required). The first three models are considered subsets of 
the general model and thus have higher variance, and the fourth model presents 
all variables excluding the interest groups’ influence variable.104  
 
 104 This model is consequently able to test and generalize Chilton and Brewster’s findings in support of 
supply-side or management school theory as well as address the concern of multicollinearity. See generally 
Chilton & Brewster, supra note 45, at 212. 
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As the fourth model shows, the variables economic differences, U.S.-EU, 
and interest groups’ influence are statistically significant. The interest groups’ 
influence variable only attains two-tailed significance at the 0.1 level, while the 
economic differences and U.S.-EU attain a two-tailed significance at the 0.05 
level.105 However, domestic compliance structure as proxied by the requirement 
of legislation is not significantly associated with in-time compliance.106 In 
comparison, a case where legislation is required with majoritarian rule and/or 
single-member districts is shown to decrease the rate of in-time compliance by 
approximately eighty-eight percent.107 These models, therefore, present 
empirical evidence that support the underlying claim that it is not just the fact 
that legislative reforms are tedious compliance avenues, it is the way that 
legislatures are embedded into the particular (international) political economy 
that drive non-compliance.  
B. Time-to Compliance 
The Cox PH model was utilized because it does not require a theoretical 
baseline estimate of normal survival. That is, it is theoretically unknowable how 
long compliance would normally take. The Cox PH model, when compared to 
other survival or duration models, affords theoretical flexibility in light of the 
parameterization of a particular baseline hazard.108 Without a clear theory to 
drive the baseline hazard, the Cox PH model was found to be the most 
appropriate survival analysis. Nineteen cases were “right-censored” as 
implementation had yet to occur.  
  
 
 105 Here it can be argued that tinges of neorealist theory manifest in the data. Both the economic difference 
and the U.S.-EU variables corroborate with some neorealist assumptions of power and compliance. See, e.g., 
John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995). However, in light 
of the following Cox PH model and the significance of the interest groups’ influence, there seems to be more 
occurring here than an austere neorealist theory would predict. Notably, the significance of these two variables 
does not undercut the enforcement approach, which would argue that these variables in fact play an important 
role in the two-level games governments play when determining efficient breach of international obligations. 
See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, Effectuating Public International Law Through Market Mechanisms?, 165 J. INST. 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 33, 35 (2009).  
 106 With a two-tailed level of significance at 0.34, this variable does not attain any conventional level of 
significance.  
 107 100 × {[ (−2.1205 × 1) − (−2.1205 × 0)] ÷ [ (−2.1205 × 0)]} ≅ −88 
 108 See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones, Time is of The Essence: Event History Models 
in Political Science, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1414, 1416 (1997) (“Inclusion of right-censored observations in the 
model implicitly treats them as having experienced the event (policy adoption) when in fact they have not. And 
since we cannot foretell the future, we do not know how ‘much longer’ (if ever) censored observations would 
go before experiencing an event.”). 
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Table 3: Time-to Compliance Cox PH Model 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Interest Groups’ Influence -0.76** (0.34) 
  -1.00** 
(0.50) 





Economic Differences   0.28 (0.19) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
US-EU   -0.43 (0.31) 
-0.36 
(0.31) 
Non-tariff Barriers   -0.17 (0.28) 
-0.18 
(0.28) 
Agriculture   0.14 (0.36) 
0.04 
(0.36) 


















(-2) Log Likelihood 882.37 880.37 882.34 871.38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As Table 3 shows, the interest groups’ influence variable is the only 
significant variable109 associated with an increase in the time-to compliance with 
an adverse decision. These data, therefore, suggest that required legislation with 
majoritarian rule and/or single-member districts extends non-compliance by 
approximately sixty-three percent.110 Moreover, this model finds no evidence in 
support of Spilker’s claim that agricultural NTBs are significantly associated 
with time-to compliance.111 However, this Article supports the same underlying 
theoretical proposition of the enforcement approach. This Article, though, 
argues that the variable majoritarian rules and/or single-member districts better 
 
 109 The -coefficient of -1 for the interest groups’ influence variable here denotes the log-hazard per one-
month change. The sign is expectedly negative, meaning that the presence of this variable extends the survival 
of non-compliance.  
 110 100 × {[ (−0.9986 × 1) − (−0.9986 × 0)] ÷ [ (−0.9986 × 0)]} ≅ −63 
 111 See Spilker, supra note 19, at 12. 
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proxy interest group influence than testing for the agricultural sector alone. 
Finally, it is important to note that two variables—the economic differences and 
the US-EU dispute variable—were significant in the question of in-time 
compliance but are no longer statistically significant when it comes to the 
timeframe of compliance. Thus, in conjunction with the binary logistic 
regressions, interest groups’ influence is the only variable to be statistically 
significant for both in-time and time-to compliance.  
C. Robustness Checks 
To test whether particular methodological decisions drove the results of this 
Article, various robustness checks were utilized regarding 1) aggregation 
strategies; 2) democratic differences; and 3) U.S. compliance. None of these 
checks undermined the thesis of this Article, as there were no scenarios where 
domestic compliance structure was statistically significant while interest groups’ 
influence was not.  
1. Aggregation Strategies 
There are two ways in which more than two parties are implicated in 
disputes. There could be two separate cases alleging the same WTO violation112 
or there could be more than one complainant within a single case. When there is 
one case with more than one complainant, the analysis is a straightforward 
aggregation, but when there are multiple cases regarding the same core issue, a 
respondent’s implementation could resolve multiple disputes at once. 
Additionally, due to follow-up DSU 21.5 (implementation disputes) and DSU 
22 (remedy disputes), a core violation could be repeated in a dataset absent 
aggregation. If unaccounted for, this repetition could distort results.  
In light of these concerns, this Article chose to aggregate dyads in the general 
model. This strategy was driven by the fact that the most long-lasting and 
controversial disputes have multiple cases by the same country regarding 
implementations.113 This should not come as a surprise because a controversial 
violation would lead to many follow-up disputes with a large number of 
stakeholders. Despite these concerns, the models were re-fitted with dispute 
 
 112 Although, since the formation of the WTO, this has become less common. See generally Antonis 
Antoniadis, Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO Disptue Settlement Undertanding, 29 LEGAL ISSUES OF 
ECON. INTEGRATION 285 (2002). 
 113 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US—Softwood Lumber IV, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted 
Dec. 20, 2005), which had three separate dispute settlement proceedings regarding the same issue. In fact, the 
Softwood Lumber disputes had six iterations. Id. 
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dyads instead of aggregated dispute issues to check for potential bias in the 
culling of the dataset. For both in-time and time-to compliance, the refitted 
models show even greater support for the interest groups’ influence variable and 
even less support for the domestic compliance structure variable.114 
2. Domestic Differences 
In the general models, decisions by the European Council and the National 
People’s Congress of China115 were coded as not requiring legislation due to the 
fact that neither are directly elected legislative systems. Initially, this Article 
argues that the tedious nature of legislation stems from the fact that it is directly 
elected and, as such, has unique veto players. Despite the theoretical 
justification, the models were recoded with a more liberal understanding of 
required legislation. With this new coding, for the in-time compliance models, 
interest groups’ influence maintains a two-tailed significance at the 0.05 level, 
while domestic compliance structure still does not reach any conventional levels 
of significance. Conversely, no variable tested in the newly fitted time-to 
compliance Cox PH model reached conventional levels of significance.116 
However, it is important to note that the recoding of this data may be 
theoretically inappropriate. Finally, the domestic compliance structure variable 
again does not reach any conventional level of significance, at the very least 
suggesting the limitations of management school theory.  
3. United States Compliance 
Following Chilton and Brewster, testing U.S. compliance alone was 
important due to the unique role the United States has played in the WTO. 
Because the United States does not have PR, the interest groups’ influence 
variable presents perfect multicollinearity with the domestic compliance 
structure variable. So this specified model cannot tell us anything about the 
implication of PR as there is no variability to test the theory. That being said, 
this particular specification generalizes Chilton and Brewster’s findings in 
regard to time-to compliance. Here, the domestic compliance structure variable 
attains a two-tailed significance at the 0.01 level, and it is the only variable found 
 
 114 Whereas previously two-tailed significance was at the 0.1 level for in-time compliance, it is now at the 
0.05 level for the interest groups’ influence variable. For time-to compliance, two-tailed significance, originally 
at the 0.05, is now at the 0.01 level for the interest groups’ influence variable. The domestic compliance structure 
variable again does not reach any conventional levels of significance.  
 115 Though there was only one such case: China—Intellectual Property Rights. See Panel Report, supra 
note 29.  
 116 The interest’s groups influence variable attains a two-tailed significance at the 0.13 level. 
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to be significantly associated with time-to compliance at any conventional levels 
of significance.117 However, no significance was found regarding in-time 
compliance for any of the variables. Some of the methodological and coding 
differences between these studies must have resulted in this discrepancy, though 
it is reassuring that similar results were found between the Cox PH models.  
CONCLUSION 
The “new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship” between international 
relations and international law has developed important findings surrounding 
compliance.118 As with all empirical work, theories have emerged to interpret 
and drive findings. In international legal compliance theory, two divergent 
understandings of WTO compliance have surfaced: the enforcement approach, 
where the exogeneity of rational choice reigns, and the management school, 
where the need for status drives interests and non-compliance occurs due to 
capacity constraints or treaty ambiguity within a domestic compliance structure.  
To test these theories, it was necessary to analyze gross interests (interest 
groups’ influence) as well as capacity constraints and treaty ambiguity (domestic 
compliance structure). The legislation-required variable was considered an 
appropriate test of the management school because treaties were considered to 
be sufficiently clarified through the many rounds of consultations and rulings. 
The majoritarian rules and/or single-member districts variable was considered 
an appropriate test of the enforcement approach because it is well documented 
in the literature that such government structures are the most susceptible to 
interest group influence.  
Where both variables were present, empirical models suggested a 
statistically significant association in both in-time compliance and time-to 
compliance with the interest groups’ influence variable, while no conventional 
significance was attained with the domestic compliance structure variable in 
either model. Therefore, the results presented in this Article demonstrate that 
non-compliance occurs not due to capacity constraints, as the management 
school predicts, but, rather, due to the political economic considerations of 
governments, as predicted by the enforcement approach. 
However, some methodological limitations are present in this Article, of 
which two themes shall be highlighted: over-specification and generalizability. 
Regarding the research specificity, this Article is only a study of cases where 
 
 117 In this specified model, there are forty-one cases and eight right-censored cases for the Cox PH model.  
 118 See Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood, supra note 2. 
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complainants emerge victorious and have not resorted to mutually agreed 
solutions before the adoption of reports. Busch and Reinhardt have shown that 
most dispute resolution occurs outside of the formal DSB process, meaning this 
Article, which focuses outside of “the shadow of the law,” ignores keys 
components of dispute settlement.119 Moreover, the choice to proxy domestic 
compliance structure and interest groups’ influence is an operationalizing move 
that is invariably imperfect. Ultimately, it would be false to say that these 
variables flawlessly follow the two theories presented in this Article, though they 
remain relevant. In terms of generalizability, the DSB has been hailed as one of 
the most successful international legal regimes due to its compliance 
mechanism. This may provide difficulties for generalizability as no other 
international institution has such a retaliatory compliance feature. In terms of 
testing the theory, it would not be surprising to see the enforcement approach 
and management school being more or less contextually relevant in light of the 
particular international organization. This highlights the importance of 
understanding the uniqueness of each case and prudently generalizing the 
theoretical implications.  
Despite these limitations, this Article provides theoretical, empirical, and 
policy considerations to the literature. Theoretically, this Article will be a step 
toward building further justification for the enforcement approach. This Article 
also contributes to the theoretical debate in international relations concerning 
whether to focus analysis at the domestic or international level. Findings in this 
Article suggest that national interest is not only driven by the structure of the 
international system but is also constructed by constitutive segments of special 
interest.  
Empirically, as described in the literature review, there are few papers that 
have attempted to answer the enforcement/management question. Of those 
recent studies, the DSB as a whole has only been analyzed from 1995 until 2006. 
This means that the DSB has more than doubled in age since the latest analysis 
of adverse decisions. Not only does this study update current research with a 
novel dataset, but it also remedies some of the methodological issues previously 
noted.  
Finally, in the realm of policymaking, understanding how compliance 
incentives operate can help tailor DSB enforcement reforms. This Article, which 
highlights the prevalence of foot-dragging in WTO compliance, gives more 
credence to reforms concerning retroactive financial compensation that have 
 
 119 See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 42. 
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been advocated by several scholars.120 Moreover, the “last resort” retaliatory 
measure often forces complainants to “shoot themselves in the foot” through 
trade sanctions by restricting domestic export opportunities or important import 
channels.121 These sanctions are imposed in the hopes that a respondent country 
incurs enough costs to challenge its special interest. The evidence presented in 
this Article confirms that retaliatory sanctions, while tempting to some 
countries, are ineffective if haphazardly deployed. Furthermore, if retaliatory 
sanctions were to be considered, targeted (and even more modest) sanctions 
against key interest groups would be more effective than broader sanctions that 
could generate greater tariff revenue. Counterintuitively, smaller and targeted 
sanctions may leave a complainant government better off when trying to 
incentivize both interest groups and respondent governments to comply with 
adverse decisions.  
In light of these considerations, there are three avenues for further research. 
First, if there really is a systematic element that is driving twenty percent of 
implementation cases towards non-compliance, it will not solely be ascertained 
through the use of statistical models. While the direction of causality is not in 
question, as it is not the case that WTO disputes drive political economics or 
domestic compliance structure, the causal mechanisms are not as obvious. This 
quantitative work can frame future research that focuses on sets of case studies. 
This could strengthen the analysis that this Article provides and could help 
further resolve the theoretical interplay between the enforcement approach and 
the management school. For example, despite adverse rulings, the United States 
chose not to comply with the findings of the panel in U.S.—Gambling. One of 
the reasons why the United States was found in violation was because it could 
not successfully invoke the General Agreement on Trade in Services exception 
provisions as it allowed certain domestic online gambling enterprises to operate 
despite a general prohibition on online gambling.122 Why was that the case? This 
study cannot definitively say interest groups’ influence drove the controversy. 
Qualitative research on this and other similar matters may provide important 
causal analysis and generalize the findings of this analysis. Second, the study of 
international legal compliance, while already a robust field, could benefit from 
 
 120 See Marco Bronckers & Naboth Van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO Improving the 
Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101, 101 (2005). 
 121 See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: 
Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT’L LAWYER 1095, 1103 (1994).  
 122 See James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-Border Gambling and Betting: The WTO Dispute Between 
Antigua and the United States, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. R. ¶15 (2004) (“[I]n response to the Panel’s interim report, 
the United States Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, said, in speaking of the GATS exception to protect 
public morals, ‘If this isn’t an exception that they should meet, I don’t know what is.’”).  
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the theory suggested in this Article. Therefore, the methodology strategy 
developed in this Article could easily be applied to other international legal 
regimes. Third, a focus on domestic compliance structure could deepen 
contemporary approaches.  
The WTO is a distinct organization with a unique enforcement mechanism. 
However, as international law further matures, academics and international 
policymakers alike should look to analyses of the DSB to glean inspiration for 
research and advocacy decisions. For without better enforcement, international 
law remains a set of maxims that may reflect actions that governments would 
have otherwise still taken. To change the behavior of nations, we must change 
the incentives.  
  
KRISHNAMURTHY GALLEYPROOFS 3/8/2018 2:08 PM 
408 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
 
